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Parties are often treated as unitary actors, where individual members coalesce to 
reach common goals. However, individuals or larger factions in parties must 
overcome a variety of collective action problems in coordinating.
2
 Many scholars 
have looked at these issues in the context of party formation, but few have 
considered how factional dynamics can make the unitary actor assumption 
untenable after the initial formation. 
Factions impinge on the process of party position-taking. They bind the leader in 
the choice of party platform, which is not solely determined by the overall policy 
preferences of individual members. Recent research shows that factional 
preferences determine party position and influence party change and policy-
making.
3
 Scholars have shown that factional affiliation and heterogeneous policy 
preferences generate party disunity in roll call votes and may explain differences 
in parliamentary voting behaviour.
4
  Relaxing the unitary actor assumption can 
also help analyzing coalition governments.
5
 On the one hand, factionalized parties 
may help overcome gridlock in decision-making or coalition formation,
6
 but on 
the other hand factional disputes over portfolio allocation may undermine cabinet 
stability and survival.
7
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Giannetti and Laver highlight how, ‘In the real political world … it is often 
difficult to discuss the making and breaking of parties without referring to factions 
or groupings of some shape and form’.8 Accordingly, this article analyzes the 
determinants of party fission, which potentially can alter the nature of party 
competition and even the party system. 
In my theoretical framework, I consider factions to be rational actors coordinating 
their members’ behaviour in order to maximize their own share of payoffs. As a 
consequence, their decision to exit or adhere to the party is based on the estimated 
policy, office, and electoral payoffs, but also interaction with the party leader, 
who alters her responses to minority requests depending on her interest in either 
party unity (keeping the party together) or cohesion (enhancing agreement on the 
party line). 
Factionalized parties may be found in several countries, and internal disputes are 
potential sources of party break-up worldwide.
9
 However, this article will focus 
on Italy, often seen as the prime example of ‘the politics of faction’.10 In both the 
First (1946-1993) and the Second Republic (1994-present), Italian parties faced 
bitter internal conflicts, often leading to splits and reshuffles of the party system. 
For instance, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) experienced several fissions, as 
factions broke away to create new rival parties like the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) and the Italian Socialist Democratic Party (PSDI). In 2011, the People of 
Freedom (PDL) party split in the wake of internal strife between its main 
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politicians, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the former Speaker of the 
Lower Chamber, Gianfranco Fini. The minority faction led by Fini broke away in 
response to sanctions imposed by the core of the party. 
Beside the high frequency of party splits, the Italian case has some more 
advantages. The large number of parties in each Legislature (approximately ten) 
and the broad number of factions (on average, three within each divided party) 
make a large-N statistical analysis feasible. Moreover, the high instability rate of 
Italian cabinets (sixty governments in sixty-five years) allows tracking changes in 
alliances, party policy positions, and intra-party portfolio allocations on a nearly 
annual basis. Furthermore, the reforms implemented since 1993 allow assessing 
the effects of different electoral systems while holding country-level features 
constant. Thus, Italy provides a suitable political laboratory to test hypotheses 
based on the general theoretical model.
11
 
Quantitative text analysis of a large number of documents on the ‘internal life’ of 
Italian parties allows us to determine the policy preferences of intra-party actors. I 
create a dataset with information on the ideal points of 254 Italian party factions 
from 1946 to 2011, based on motions presented during party congresses. This 
dataset provides new data on intra-party politics,
12
 and allows broadening the 
analysis of party fission beyond offices and electoral motives.
13
 
My results support the argument that faction behaviour is driven by several 
motives and shaped by policy incentives in addition to office and electoral 
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rewards. Strategic portfolio allocation, party loyalty, and disproportional electoral 
systems that increase the exit costs tend to preserve party unity. Conversely, 
leaders that focused on promoting cohesion over unity will be less prone to 
respond to internal dissent, increasing the likelihood of factional breakaways. In 
sum, inter-factional disputes and compromises are important sources of party 
unity and party fission, but internal rules or features of the political system such as 
the electoral law or party system competitiveness also shape intra-party 
competition. 
 
A THEORY OF PARTY UNITY AND PARTY FISSION 
Parties are voluntary associations composed of like-minded individuals joining 
together to solve collective action and coordination problems. Party members and 
party factions may extract greater payoffs both in the parliamentary arena 
(through log-rolling and coordinated voting behaviour) and in the electoral market, 
where enforced cohesion increases the value of party label and improves an MP’s 
prospects for reelection.
14
 
However, the party is not a monolithic actor as members may hold heterogeneous 
preferences. Members with similar views gather and give birth to factions within a 
party. From this perspective, a party can be seen as a coalition of factions.
15
 
Factions compete against each other to take control of the party and maximise 
their share of payoffs while cooperating to produce public goods and party unity, 
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which the leader is responsible for preserving.
16
 Intra-party politics swings 
between conflict and cooperation, with factions seeking a balance between the 
two. In the words of Laver and Kato, to the extent that ‘political parties are 
endogenous, then members of party factions may be seen to belong for as long as 
it is rational to do so’.17 Accordingly, inter-factional struggles and bargaining take 
place in the shadow of party fission. 
I propose a game-theoretic model based on the ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ 
framework to shed light on party splits and the determinants of factional 
breakaways.
18
 Figure 1 presents a game of party unity and party fission, 
describing factional disputes over payoff allocations under the threat of party 
break-up. For simplicity, I consider only two actors, the party leader, L, tied to the 
mainstream faction (composed of her followers) and a minority faction of 
dissenting members, F. The minority’s size α is the share of congress votes won 
by the faction (a positive value below 0.5). The total amount of office payoffs to 
be shared sum to μ, which is equal to one, and any strategy undermining party 
unity imposes costs on the actors. L is in charge of allocating scarce resources 
such as cabinet spoils (office payoffs), the party line (policy payoffs), and 
candidacies (electoral payoffs) between the two factions. 
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FIGURE 1 Party Unity and Party Fission Game 
 
Note: μ  = value of party unity; α = minority’s size; ν = damage due to public voice; ε = exit cost; 
π = minority payoffs after breakaway; ω = loss due to party fission. We assume that: μ = 1; 0 < α < 
0.5; ε  (0,0.5); π  (0,0.5); ω  (0,0.5); ν  (0,0.5) and ν < α. F = minority faction; L = party 
leader. Payoffs are indicated in square brackets and kept separated by a semicolon. Faction payoffs 
are indicated first, followed by leader payoffs. 
 
The leader needs to reward her supporters to avoid being dismissed. She will 
exploit her dominant position to retain all of the benefits and propose an unfair 
deal to the minority. The minority may then accept or use voice. If the faction 
complies, the gain will be zero (as dissenters are excluded from the allocation of 
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rewards), and the leader’s payoffs will be equal to μ (outcome U1). 19 If F uses 
voice, the entire party incurs costs ν due to the public exposure of internal dissent. 
L can then propose a new deal. She can either reverse her choice, offering a 
compromise (where each faction will be rewarded on the basis of its strength), or 
use the whip to force the minority to accept her original position. A compromise 
will give the minority faction F α μ - ν, and retain (1 - α) μ - ν for L (outcome U2). 
If L uses the whip option, the game reaches a final stage where the dissenters 
either comply or leave the party. If they toe the line (outcome U3), they in essence 
get the same payoffs as under the first stage outcome U1 (when F plays ‘accept’) 
reduced the cost ν for displaying intra-party disagreement to the public.20 
Conversely, if the minority faction breaks away (outcome U4), F receives a payoff 
of π - ε, i.e., the benefit obtained when creating a new party minus the cost of 
leaving the current party. In case of a split, L receives all the benefits less the 
contribution of the minority faction leaving the party. The leader does not incur 
any cost for party disunity after a split, as the party becomes more cohesive, but 
suffers a cost ω for the loss in strength and image caused by the party break-up. 
Her final payoff will be (1 - α) μ - ω. 
A number of results can be shown using backward induction. In the final stage, F 
faces the choice between ‘exit’ and ‘accept’. For values of ε larger than π the exit 
cost is too high if compared to the benefit of  a breakaway. Unless the cost of 
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party disunity ν is high as well, the minority has a non-credible threat to split (i.e., 
F’spayoffs are higher inside the party as π - ε < 0 - ν) and will always accept the 
whip rather than leave the party. This is the second best outcome for L (who 
receives all of the payoffs minus the cost ν).  F knows that it would be better off 
by choosing ‘accept’ at the first stage (due to ν) and agrees to the unfair deal U1. 
This pattern resembles that of the ‘dictator game’, where the responder has little 
choice but to accept the proposal.  
On the other hand, when ε is larger than π but ν is high (so that π - ε > 0 - ν), F 
retains a credible weak threat (in case it splits, the faction can only minimize its 
loss).
21
 In this scenario, the outcome could be either U1 or U2 (Agreement). When 
the cost of party breakup ω is lower than the cost of party disunity ν for the leader 
L, party fission will be less damaging than bargaining for a compromise. As a 
consequence, F will accept the unfair deal (U1) to avoid the negative payoff of a 
breakaway. Conversely, when ω is greater than ν, L will focus on preserving unity 
at any cost to avoid the risk of party fission at the last stage. This induces a 
compromise and a final outcome U2. 
Finally, when ε is relatively small and π is large, F chooses ‘exit’ at the last stage 
and threatens to leaving to enhance its bargaining power and obtain a larger share. 
When ω is sufficiently large, L prefers to negotiate a compromise (U2). However, 
if ω is lower than ν, L will seek cohesion even at the expense of party unity and 
refuse a new deal, using the whip against dissenters and generating a Breakaway 
outcome U4. 
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Table 1 summarizes the possible outcomes of the game based on the relationship 
between the four parameters  π, representing the payoffs available to the minority 
faction after the breakaway; ε, which is the exit cost; ν, is the cost due to public 
voice; ω, which expresses the loss due to party fission.  
 
TABLE 1 Summary of the Possible Outcomes of the Game and the Strategies 
Played by the Two Actors Based on the Relationship Between the Parameters 
 Faction threat to break away 
 Non-credible 
(ε > π) and  
(π - ε < 0 - ν) 
Weak and credible  
(ε > π) and  
(π - ε > 0 - ν) 
 Strong and credible 
(ε < π) Leadership 
attitude 
Focus on unity 
(ω >  ν) 
U1: Unfair deal 
(Accept) 
U2: Agreement 
(Voice; Compromise) 
 U2: Agreement 
(Voice; Compromise) 
Focus on cohesion 
(ω <  ν) 
U1: Unfair deal 
(Accept) 
U1: Unfair deal 
(Accept) 
 U4: Breakaway 
(Voice, Exit; Whip) 
 
 
This game highlights the relative power of the party leader L and the minority 
faction F and how these affect intra-party distributive dynamics (i.e., portfolio 
allocation and party change). The likelihood of party fission is determined by two 
key elements, 1) the bargaining power of the minority, given by its ability to make 
a credible threat, and 2) the party leader’s relative interest in unity or cohesion. 
When the minority has a non-credible threat, the party leader has no incentive to 
pursue a compromise as party unity is not threatened. Potential splinter groups can 
exploit their bargaining power to demand a fair deal only when they have a 
credible threat. In turn, the leader will accommodate the minority’s requests only 
if a breakaway will damage the party more than internal dissent. The minority is 
more likely to split when the payoffs are greater outside the party than inside 
(because of the unfair distribution) and exit costs are low (for instance, if there is 
11 
 
no strong loyalty or the electoral system does not create barriers for new actors). 
Conversely, the leader will pander to the minority when party unity is an issue at 
stake and fission would be a huge loss for the party, for example if a ruling party 
has a narrow margin over the opposition. A split is more likely when ideological 
disharmony and internal voice damage the image of the party. For example, 
dominant or ruling parties rarely tolerate dissent when they have a wide 
parliamentary margin. In such cases, party leaders will focus more on cohesion 
than unity. 
These implications suggest a number of specific testable hypotheses related to the 
parameters in the game. I start by consider attributes that affect the balance 
between the cost of exit (ε) and the net benefit of a breakaway (π)  for potential 
splinter groups to determine when a minority can gain from a breakaway and 
hence has a credible threat to split off from the party. 
Any element increasing the share of policy, office, and electoral payoffs available 
to the splinter group after breaking away (π), will make a split more likely. Party 
members (and factions) incur a cost from party membership.
22
 The cost is large 
when factions have ideal points far from the bulk of party members and hence 
fewer payoffs from policy. A breakaway may thus allow fringe factions to 
minimize membership cost and establish a party platform with larger policy 
payoffs (higher π). Assuming that party position corresponds to the weighted 
mean of all factions,
23
 I propose the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1: A breakaway by a faction i is more likely the greater the distance 
between i and the party position.
24
 
Factions are of course also interested in office payoffs and career rewards. They 
will consider their share of payoffs within the party and any potential gains after a 
breakaway. Hence, ‘overpaid’ factions with shares of office payoffs greater than 
their vote share should be less willing to split.
25
 Conversely, ‘underpaid’ factions 
have larger expected payoffs (π) from defecting. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher/lower office payoffs relative to faction size 
decreases/increases the likelihood of a split. 
Factions also consider electoral rewards, e.g., the number of parliamentary seats 
they can win in future elections. More disproportional electoral rules preserve 
party systems and act as barriers to new parties. They increase the exit costs (ε) 
for dissidents
26
 and limits their ability to extract additional policy and office 
payoffs in the long-run, thus decreasing π. These effects should be greater under 
single-member plurality systems, but can also apply under proportional 
representation (PR).  
Hypothesis 3: A more disproportional electoral system decreases the likelihood of 
a breakaway. 
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 Using the median faction position as a proxy for party ideal point does not 
alter the results. 
25
 Minority factions could be overpaid when their threat is credible and the 
party leader is concerned about party unity (see below). Once overpaid, 
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 The splinter group will face high start-up costs for creating a new party and 
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Candidate selection (the way MPs are selected) is another distributional issue 
affecting party unity. The estimated costs and benefits of a split for potential 
splinter groups depend on their chances of gaining seats. The party leader tends to 
retain control over candidate selection under closed-list PR and centralized 
selection procedures,
27
 and is thus able to exclude dissenting factions. Minority 
factions that defy the leader fear being excluded from the party list in retaliation. 
Thus, the limited room for dissent should decrease exit costs (ε). Conversely, 
open-list PR provides factions with access to parliamentary seats through 
preference voting. This institutionalises factionalism and decreases the likelihood 
of splits. 
Hypothesis 4: Closed-list PR and centralized candidate selection increase the 
likelihood of a breakaway. 
Party loyalty affects the balance between the costs (ε) and the benefits (π) of a 
breakaway. More specifically, partisan ties to symbols such as logos, labels, and 
the ‘logic of appropriateness’28 internalized through participation might dissuade 
members from leaving.
29
 This is particularly relevant for older parties where party 
loyalty is well established and increases the exit cost (ε). 
Hypothesis 5: The loyalty effect decreases the likelihood of party fissions in older 
parties. 
In addition to features that provide minority factions with incentives or 
disincentives to break away, the model also suggests that leaders can have 
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different attitudes to party unity.
30
 Leaders may seek to preserve unity at any cost 
(when ω > ν), or alternatively seek cohesion over a clear party line, with a 
willingness to eliminate internal challengers at any cost (ω < ν). The game 
illustrates how leaders will accommodate potential splinter group to decrease the 
likelihood of party fission. At the same time, if internal dissent is too damaging 
for the party, leaders will ignore the minority and make it more inclined to leave. 
Leadership’s attitude is related to internal democracy. Parties with intransigent 
rules, for instance parties organized according to ‘democratic centralism’ (e.g., 
Marxist parties) typically do not tolerate ‘dissent’.31 Any public expression of 
internal disagreement could weaken the party in the eyes of its voters. Under 
‘democratic centralism’, party members are free to discuss party strategy and 
ideology, but can only disagree within the party. Once the party has established a 
position, dissenting members must submit. In this context, the public expression 
of dissent is costly (higher ν) and the benefits of party unity lower. Thus, the party 
leader would rather use the whip against the minority than seek a compromise. 
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of a breakup increases in parties ruled through 
‘democratic centralism’.32 
                                                          
30
 I distinguish between unity, when factions support different views and 
strategies without leaving the party, and cohesion, when factions think and 
act in a cohesive manner, in agreement with the party line. 
31
 This is not only related to Marxist parties. For example, two relevant 
Italian parties such as the People of Freedom party and the Five Star 
Movement have strict internal rules. 
32
 The party leader may also expel dissenters from the party. My theory 
suggests that breakaways and expulsions stem from the same underlying 
process. 
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The cost of internal division (ν) is higher for ruling parties, which face greater 
public scrutiny than the opposition. The competitiveness of the party system and 
the margin of the ruling coalition affect the value of unity (ω) and shape the 
balance between the costs of dissent and splits. When ruling parties have narrow 
majorities, any split could jeopardize government stability. Leaders will be more 
concerned with party unity given the higher cost of a breakup when the party may 
lose office (large ω). A leader will tolerate internal divisions provided they do not 
threaten unity. This gives party minorities bargaining leverage to extract 
substantial shares within the party. Conversely, if the degree of competitiveness is 
low (small ω) and the dominant coalition has a safe parliamentary margin there is 
less need for party unity. Splits no longer threaten government stability and party 
leaders may be less concerned over party fission. As such, leaders will refuse to 
accommodate minorities, use the whipping, and pursue the intra-party game to the 
breaking point (as in U4). In other words, leaders trade unity for cohesion to 
improving government effectiveness and establish party authority.
33
 
Hypothesis 7: Fission is less likely among ruling parties when the government has 
a narrow parliamentary margin and becomes more likely as the margin widens.
34
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 The cost of voice may also be higher when a faction position is far from 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Party congresses are a competitive arena where ‘factions organize teams of 
candidates and appeal to people enjoying the right to vote for one team or 
another’.35 They generally present a policy motion attached to a list of candidates. 
This motion is an omnibus policy document that aims to shape party strategy and 
ideology. ‘Hard data’ on party factional structure drawn from party congresses 
help us determine the size, strength and policy position of factions.
36
 
I will use a new dataset with information on the policy positions of Italian party 
factions, covering both the Italian First and Second Republics, from 1946 to 2011. 
Party heterogeneity is often measured by analysing roll call votes, but Benoit, 
Bräuninger and Debus argue that content analyses of ‘texts drafted by … intra-
party groups seem to be the best choice to identify their respective preferences, in 
particular if the research question deals with changes of the positions of political 
actors over time’.37 In addition, the effect of party discipline should be lower in 
intra-party debates then roll call votes or parliamentary speeches, which ‘may not 
reflect the true distribution of preferences’38 and are less well suited for analysing 
intra-party politics. Conversely, party factions can theoretically express their 
sincere preferences in a congress motion. 
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I assess policy positions through the motions submitted by factions for voting in 
contested congresses.
39
 Missing data prevented us from including a few 
congresses.
40
 Table 2 summarizes the dataset, which covers 254 motions at 
eighty-three congresses for eighteen parties.
41
 
 
TABLE 2 List of Parties, Number of Congresses, Motions, and Breakaways 
Included in the Analysis 
Party Label Congresses 
Held 
Contested 
Congresses  
Missing Included 
in Dataset 
Included 
(%)  
Motions Breakaways 
AN National Alliance 3 1 0 1 100 4 1 
DC Christian Democrats 18 13 2 11 85 41 0 
DS Democrats of the Left 4 4 0 4 100 12 2 
FV Federation of the Greens 18 16 14 2 13 6 1 
MSI Italian Social Movement 17 7 2 5 71 20 1 
                                                          
39
 Motions were collected by examining the official proceedings of national 
congresses and official party newspapers or reviews. Congresses where 
factions competed without presenting any motions are excluded. 
40
 After the collapse of the Italian party system in 1992-1994, many archives 
disappeared when parties folded, complicating the task of finding data. I 
estimate that this database includes 50 per cent of the contested congresses of 
all Italian parties. The percentage of missing cases is approximately 30 per 
cent among the parties included in the dataset. This rate is higher for 
Democratic Party (PD), PSDI and the Greens. Excluding these from the 
analysis does not alter my findings. 
41
 The average length of the documents is 5,627 words. Only 14 per cent of 
texts contain fewer than 1,000 words. The lengths are large enough to ensure 
valid estimates.The dataset is unbalanced as there are more observations for 
some parties. I gathered thirty-eight motions nested in twelve PSI congresses, 
but only two motions for the Party of the Italian Communists (PDCI) and the 
Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC). However, excluding 
parties with few observations does not alter the results. 
18 
 
NPSI New Italian Socialist Party 6 2 0 2 100 4 2 
PCI Italian Communist Party 16 3 0 3 100 8 1 
PD Democratic Party 3 3 2 1 33 3 0 
PDA Action Party 3 2 1 1 50 3 1 
PDCI Party of the Italian Communists 5 1 0 1 100 2 1 
PLI Italian Liberal Party 19 11 0 11 100 35 0 
PRC Communist Refoundation Party 7 6 0 6 100 20 6 
PRI Italian Republican Party 22 15 4 11 73 25 0 
PS Socialist Party 2 1 0 1 100 3 0 
PSDI 
Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party 
20 21 12 9 43 25 4 
PSI Italian Socialist Party 24 12 0 12 100 38 7 
PSIUP 
Italian Socialist Party of 
Proletarian Unity 
4 1 0 1 100 3 2 
UDC 
Union of Christian and Centre 
Democrats 
3 1 0 1 100 2 1 
Total  194 120 37 83 69 254 30 
 
The policy positions were extracted from the motions using Wordfish, an 
automated scaling model that  analyzes the frequency of all of the words 
contained in a document.
42
 Wordfish assigns each word a value β and 
differentiates the texts according to the words used, thus allowing us to 
distinguish the policy positions of actors. These positions are estimated along a 
single dimension capturing the political content of the texts. Given the nature of 
the motions (as discussed above), this dimension can be interpreted as a left-right 
scale.
43
 
A key advantage of Wordfish here is the ability to produce time-series estimates. 
These allow analyzing motions from different points in time under the assumption 
that words usage remains constant. Given the large temporal span of the analysis 
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 Wordfish has been used previously to assess the policy positions of 
political actors and provide reliable estimates: Proksch and Slapin 2009a; 
Proksch and Slapin 2009b; Proksch and Slapin 2010; Slapin and Proksch 
2008. 
43
 In the 84 per cent of cases (seventy congresses out of eighty-three), at least 
two factions have positions that are statistically different from each other. 
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this assumption could be questioned. To ensure linguistic stability and reliable 
estimates, the motions were divided into two time periods, before and after 
1989.
44
 
The face validity of the estimates was tested in various ways. The values of the 
discrimination parameter β provides an output diagnostic. Words with large β 
values are located at the extremes of the left-right scale. Figure 2 displays the 
frequency  of each word across all documents on the vertical scale (fixed effect),
45
 
along with the values of β parameters on the horizontal axis, highlighting some 
selected words (translated to English). 
 
FIGURE 2 Diagnostic of Words Estimates. Word Frequency (Fixed Effect) and β 
Values (Left-Right Scale) for the First (black) and the Second Period (grey) 
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 The downfall of Communism changed the political meaning of some 
words and contributed to the beginning of the Italian transition, altering the 
Italian party system in the early 1990s. In both periods, the number of unique 
words analyzed is approximately 35,000. Factions positions are correlated 
(0.7) with the same estimates measured on the whole dataset. 
45
 The fixed effect is measured by the logged mean count of  each word to 
capture how some words are used more often by all parties. Common words 
that appear with higher frequency across documents  (e.g., prepositions) 
retain a higher fixed effect (frequency). However, they are not associated 
with political differences and their discriminating power (β) is close to zero. 
Conversely, the discriminating power of rare words used only by a few 
parties will be higher. 
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For the first period we find words (shown in black) traditionally associated with 
conservative values, such as god, motherland, and family on the right, and class, 
solidarity, and nationalization on the left. For the second, we observe words 
(shown in grey) such as no-global and collective bargaining on the left, and 
meritocratic and devolution on the right wing. Words refer to different issues (e.g., 
economic, social, and foreign policies). For instance, concerns about 
unemployment and redistribution are attributed to left-wing parties, while 
disinflation and privatization are associated with the right. For social policy, the 
left stresses laity while the right emphasizes birth rate and words related to law 
and order such as crime. In foreign policy, the left talks about peace and 
disarmament while the right expresses support to soldiers. The examples indicate 
that the β values assigned to words seem to correspond to how they are used in 
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Italian political discourse and that the words appear on the correct side of the left-
right scale. 
As a second test to demonstrate that faction positions are estimated correctly, 
Figure 3 plots the policy positions of all the factions in the analysis by congress, 
using different symbols for the political family. Post-fascist parties (MSI and AN, 
denoted by black dots) are located on the far-right. The liberal-democratic family 
(PLI, grey squares) is on the centre-right. Christian democrats (DC, grey pluses) 
are located in the centre during the first period, and shift to the centre-right in the 
second period (UDC). Social-democratic and non-Marxist left parties (PSDI, PDA, 
PRI, DS, PD, NPSI, Greens, denoted by black triangles) appear on the centre-left 
in the first period but shift towards the centre in the 1980s. Finally, socialist and 
communist parties (PCI, PSI, PSIUP,PRC, PDCI, denoted by an x) are located on 
the left wing. 
There is rarely much overlap among observations across different political 
families. The wings are properly arrayed; for example, left-wing factions are to 
the left side and hold notably different positions from the party mainstream.
46
 The 
weighted means of factions positions, measured at each party congress, is 
positively correlated with other estimates of party position.
47
 Moreover, the 
faction estimates also track the evolution of the party system, and the key changes 
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 Confidence intervals are available in an online appendix. 
47
 The correlation with expert surveys is 0.8 and 0.7 with the Comparative 
Manifesto Project estimates.  The results are available upon request.  
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in party positions over time. This suggests that the estimates are valid, reliable, 
and consistent with central findings in the literature on Italian parties.
48
  
 
FIGURE 3 Faction Positions on the Left-Right Scale (Clustered by Political 
Family) 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
I test the hypotheses through logit regression, using a binary dependent variable 
Fission indicating whether a faction i leaves the party.
49
 Data encompasses 30 
breakaways for the 254 factions identified over the period 1946-2011. 
                                                          
48
 The estimates are also reliable when compared to hand-coding techniques 
that follow the Comparative Manifesto Project coding scheme (I tested this 
feature within a subsample of DC motions). 
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Figure 4 illustrates two peaks in the distribution of Fission over time, one at the 
beginning of the First Italian Republic and another after the 2006 general elections 
when the party system was particularly fluid. Still, nearly one-third of the 
breakaways occurred from 1960 to 1989 even though the Italian party system is 
normally considered relatively more stable during this period. 
 
FIGURE 4 Distribution of Fission over time during the First (1946-1993) and the 
Second Italian Republic (1994-present) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
49
 I identify a breakaway in all cases where a faction, its leader, or the 
majority of its members split off from the party body after presenting a 
motion during a congress. I consider all party splits, irrespective of their size, 
as even minor splits may change the equilibrium between parties in 
Parliament and jeopardize the electoral performance of a party. Although I 
measure fissions in the ‘Party in Central Office’, most of them also have 
consequences within the ‘Party in Public Office’ and the ‘Party on the 
Ground’. 
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On average, we observe a split every two years. As such, party fissions and 
factional breakaways are not a rare event, but an ever-present threat posed to the 
party leadership and an opportunity for minority factions to negotiate a new 
distribution of payoffs.
50
 The unit of analysis is the faction-per-cabinet. This 
allows to better assess the impact of office payoffs and parliamentary support, 
which might vary between party congresses. 
Several independent variables were adopted. To test H1, I consider Distance the 
squared Euclidean distance between faction i’s ideal point and the weighted mean 
of all factions in each congress.
51
 To test H2 I consider the impact of office 
payoffs through the Share of Ministers, the difference between faction i’s share of 
ministers and size. I assigned a value of zero for all parties not in office. To test 
H3 and H4 on the role of the electoral system I consider Disproportionality (H3), 
measured through the Gallagher index, and Closed List (H4), a dummy variable 
flagging closed list PR or plurality systems with centralized candidate selection, 
as opposed to open list PR.
52
 I test  H5 through Party Age, the number of years 
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 Giannetti 2010; Giannetti and Laver 2001; Laver and Kato 2001; Mershon 
1996.  
51
 Assigning a value of zero to factions whose positions are not statistically 
different from the median faction does not affect the results. 
52
 Italy has adopted two different electoral rules since 1994, a mixed system 
(1994-2001) with 25 per cent of seats assigned through closed list PR and the 
remaining 75 per cent via ‘first-past-the-post’, and a closed list PR with 
thresholds and a majority prize (since 2006). Between 1994 and 2001, the 
selection of candidates in single-member districts was strongly centralized, 
making this system similar to a closed list with magnitude one. Thus, we can 
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elapsed since a party’s founding, and H6 by a dummy variable for parties ruled by 
Democratic Centralism.
53
 Finally, I test H7 through an interaction between Ruling 
Party, indicating parties in office, and Parliamentary Support, or the inter-
electoral party system competitiveness measured by the size of the ruling coalition. 
The data are encoded by cabinet. I report robust standard errors clustered by 
cabinet in each party congress since avoid possible problems from non-
independent observations or non-constant variances.
54
 Table 3 presents the results. 
In model 1, I only include variables that affect the credibility of the minority 
faction threat (faction side). In model 2, I separately estimate the effect of 
elements concerning the leader’s attitude towards internal dissent (leader side). 
Model 3 includes all the variables. Considering the faction side as well the leader 
side improves the model fit.
55
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
compare open list PR systems in use until 1993 to subsequent systems: Carey 
and Shugart 1995. 
53
 This applies to the PSI, in 1949, under the orthodox leadership of Rodolfo 
Morandi and to the PDCI in 2008. 
54
 Clustered standard errors are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent: Rogers 1993. Controlling for temporal dependence through 
temporal dummies or random effects does not alter the results. A rare events 
logistic regression model does not generate different results. Approximately 
25 per cent of the observations are related to the Socialist family (PSDI and 
PSI) and one-third of the breakaways involve these two parties. A dummy 
variable for this political family does not alter the results. I also controlled for 
the impact of the electoral cycle and party left-right position, but these two 
variables were not significant and do not affect my findings. 
55
 When dealing with rare events, the area under the receiver-operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve allows evaluating the model performance. This 
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TABLE 3 Logit Regression of Faction Breakaway 
 DV: Fission 
Parameters (1) (2) (3) 
Faction side    
Distance 2.168***  2.480*** 
 (0.701)  (0.769) 
Share of Ministers -4.678*  -4.551* 
 (2.478)  (2.664) 
Disproportionality -0.398**  -0.378* 
 (0.169)  (0.200) 
Closed List 2.237***  2.584*** 
 (0.706)  (0.739) 
Party Age -0.079***  -0.071** 
 (0.028)  (0.033) 
Leader side    
Democratic Centralism  2.680*** 2.453*** 
  (0.628) (0.650) 
Ruling Party  -6.720** -7.732*** 
  (3.201) (2.875) 
Parliamentary Support   -2.927 
(3.592) 
-7.580* 
(4.584) 
Ruling Party X Parliamentary Support  11.931** 14.580*** 
  (5.610) (5.490) 
Constant -1.463* -1.813 1.823 
 (0.877) (1.847) (2.726) 
Observations 766 766 766 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.202 0.049 0.242 
Log pseudolikelihood -98.44 -117.37 -93.57 
Correctly predicted (percentage) 83.42 94. 65 85.77 
Sensitivity (percentage) 68.97 13.79 72.41 
Area under the ROC curve 0.824 
(0.046) 
0.605 
(0.056) 
0.847  
(0.042) 
Note: Standard errors clustered by cabinet in each party congress are shown in 
parentheses. Significance (two tailed): * 0.1; **0 .05; *** 0.01. The percentage of 
correctly predicted outcomes and sensitivity (percentage of correctly predicted positive 
outcomes) have been measured according to a 0.05 cut-off point, close to the actual 
outcome rate (0.04) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
area represents the probability that a randomly selected positive outcome 
(Fission) is correctly rated with a higher predicted probability than a 
randomly selected negative observation. This statistics is higher in model 3 
and indicates that both the credibility of the minority faction threat and the 
leader’s attitude towards internal dissent help in predicting party splits. Other 
measures of the goodness of fit confirm this pattern, which is consistent with 
my theoretical model. 
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The results provide strong support for my hypotheses that factions consider policy, 
office, as well as electoral payoffs. Higher Distance increases the likelihood of 
fission. As the cost of membership increases with distance from the core of party 
members, factions have incentive to leave to get larger policy payoffs after a split 
without suffering large exit costs.
56
 A higher Share of Ministers helps preserve 
party unity. Overpaid factions with a share of office payoffs greater than their size 
are less likely to break away as they would hardly ever find better conditions 
outside the party (and vice versa). In this way, party leaders may use strategic 
portfolio allocation to avoid fissions and cater to potential splinter groups. 
Factions jointly weigh policy and office payoffs as substitutes. Then, a greater 
than proportional share of office payoffs could counterbalance a lower share of 
policy payoffs.
57
 
Electoral motivation also matters. Disproportionality and Closed List are both 
significant and in line with my theory suggesting that disproportional electoral 
systems decrease the likelihood of a breakaway by increasing exit costs and 
lowering the expected electoral payoffs of splinter groups.
58
 If the electoral 
system does not guarantee reelection, dissenters prefer to remain within the party. 
                                                          
56
 The coefficient for an interaction term between Distance and Ruling Party 
is not significant. When testing the model on the subsample of parties in 
office, the effect of Distance remains the same. Given that in the Italian 
context the main reward for cabinet participation is linked to office payoffs 
(Mershon 1996), this result further support the notion that even potential 
‘office seeking’ factions also consider policy motivations. 
57
 For an analogous argument: Warwick 1998. 
58
 This finding holds when using other measures of disproportionality and 
holds when the First and the Second Italian Republic are analysed separately. 
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Conversely, closed-list PR and centralized candidate selection methods give 
leaders more power over selecting MPs, restricting the access of minority factions 
to candidacies and thus reducing the cost of leaving.
59
 Loyalty restrains minorities 
from breaking away. After controlling for Share of Ministers, which captures the 
cooperative patterns that might emerge over time, the coefficient of Party Age is 
significant. This positive effect of loyalty on unity is due to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ developed during party militancy, beyond the ‘logic of 
consequentiality’.60 On the leader side, I find that Democratic Centralism strongly 
increases the risk of a split, consistent with my claim that ‘voice’ becomes more 
expensive than a break-up when parties do not tolerate internal dissent. Thus, the 
leader will not accommodate minority factions, forcing splinter groups to accept 
the party line or break away. Table 4 reports substantive interpretations of the 
results in terms of the change in probabilities of fission for a change on each 
variable from the minimum to the maximum value (first difference). 
 
                                                          
59
 I also tested H4 through a variable Centralization, which expresses the 
degree of centralization in candidate selection process according to the rules 
described in the party statute. This variable ranges from zero to ten, where 
zero indicates a decentralized selection process while the value of ten is 
assigned to parties that adopt centralized mechanisms. This variable displays 
a positive and significant coefficient proving that centralized candidate 
selection increases the likelihood of a breakaway, consistent with H4. 
60
 This is supported when including a control variable for changes in party 
labels and symbols during the party congress (unconnected to policy 
adjustments that are captured by the variable Distance). When the party logo 
changes, the likelihood of a breakaway increases while the impact of Party 
Age still holds. 
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TABLE 4 Substantive Effects of Explanatory Variables: First Difference 
Change in probability of Fission 
Parameters  Min Max First difference  
Distance 
 
0 1.1 0.113 
 (0.057) 
Share of Ministers -0.5 
 
1 
 
-0.176 
(0.176) 
Disproportionality 1.6 10.2 -0.028 
(0.019) 
Closed List 0 1 0.127 
(0.080) 
Party Age 
 
1 51 
 
-0.089 
(0.059) 
Democratic Centralism 0 1 0.148 
(0.086) 
Ruling Party 0 1 
 
-0.423 
(0.256) 
Parliamentary Support 36 
 
84 -0.062 
(0.053) 
Note: First differences indicate the change in probabilities of fission 
when an independent variable changes from its empirical minimum 
to its maximum, and all other variables are held at their means. 
When all variables are set at their means, the predicted probability 
of fission is 0.016 (0.007). Standard errors clustered by cabinet in 
each party congress are shown in parentheses. 
 
Figure 5 displays the marginal effect of the interaction between Ruling Party and 
Parliamentary Support. When the margin of the ruling coalition is narrow, parties 
in office will be concerned about preserving unity insofar as any breakaway might 
threaten government stability. Thus, the leader will cater to potential splinter 
groups to keep the party together. Accordingly, the marginal effect is negative for 
ruling parties when Parliamentary Support is below 44 per cent of the seats. By 
contrast, party fissions are less damaging to parties in governments supported by 
wide majorities as leaders are more willing to accept the risk of fission for the 
sake of promoting government effectiveness through party cohesion. The 
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marginal effect on a breakaway becomes positive and significant for parties in 
office when Parliamentary Support exceeds 63 per cent of the seats.
61
 
 
Figure 5 Marginal Effect of Ruling Party on Fission as Parliamentary Support 
changes (with 90% confidence interval) 
 
CONCLUSION  
This article has explored determinants of party fission. I provide a game-theoretic 
model of intra-party bargaining dynamics, focusing on the impact of payoff 
                                                          
61
 The marginal effect of Parliamentary Support is positive and significant 
for any Ruling Party, but increasing Parliamentary Support implies lower 
party system competitiveness, which in turn reduces the leverage of potential 
splinter groups. This decreases the probability of splits in parties out of office 
as there are no incentives for defection when the ruling coalition has a safe 
margin. The marginal effect of Parliamentary Support is negative and 
significant for parties not in office. 
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allocations on faction breakaways from an ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ framework. 
I create new data on intra-party factional structures of Italian parties through 
quantitative content analysis of motions presented during party congresses and 
test various implications of the theory. The analysis supports my claims that 
factions consider office, policy, as well as electoral payoffs. Policy motives seem 
to drive the breaking (and making) of parties. Subgroups sharing common 
preferences are more likely to join together and more likely to split when intra-
party heterogeneity increases. Even factions often considered merely office-
seeking seem to pay attention to policy payoffs. Conversely, the strategic 
allocation of portfolios can counterbalance a lower amount of policy payoffs, thus 
contributing to preserve party unity. In turn, other elements such as party loyalty, 
disproportional electoral systems and open access to candidacies increase the exit 
costs for dissenting factions and decrease the credibility of threats to split. Splinter 
groups, however, do not make choices in isolation, and must weigh the 
leadership’s attitude to party unity when threatening to defect. Under some 
conditions leaders may be willing to compromise to preserve party unity, under 
others they may use the whip against dissenters to enhance party cohesion. 
Consistent with my theory, the level of intra-party democracy and the inter-
electoral level of party system competitiveness affect the leader’s attitude, even if 
these factors only have a slight impact on the predictive ability of the model. The 
cost of ‘voice’ is higher in parties ruled through democratic centralism where 
leaders do not tolerate dissent, making minorities inclined to break away. For 
ruling parties, the cost of a ‘breakup’ increases with a smaller margin over the 
opposition, raising the leader’s interest in a compromise to preserve party unity. 
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Conversely, leaders in ruling parties focus more on cohesion to enhance 
government effectiveness as the parliamentary support widens.
62
 The lower cost 
of a breakup declines below the cost of voice, and splits become more likely.
63
 
My findings demonstrate that parties can be considered as minimum winning 
coalitions of factions where all unnecessary subgroups are disregarded by the 
party leader and must face the choice between compliance and exit. 
This article provides strong support for parties being a product of both intra-party 
competition and the party system. Both spheres of politics provide incentives for 
party unity as well threats to cohesion. When parties are internally polarized, party 
system fragmentation can be contained through consensual intra-party dynamics, 
disproportional electoral systems, and preference voting or decentralized 
candidate selection procedures that favour the institutionalization of party factions 
such as primary elections. These aspects are highly relevant for political elites that 
aim to simplify political supply through party mergers. When a party merger is 
merely a ‘cold fusion’ process based on instrumental and strategic concerns and 
without any policy basis, the internal wings will be more likely to break away to 
undermine elites efforts to decrease the fragmentation. My results highlight how 
any reform aiming to foster party system stability should include adjustments in 
the rules of the game to help keep factionalism under control and preserve party 
unity.  
This article also demonstrates how quantitative text analysis techniques can be 
used to analyze intra-party politics and the policy preferences of factions. This 
                                                          
62
 Several studies attest that they tend to be less divided: e.g., Carey 2007. 
63
 The search for greater cohesion and the firm rejection of any internal 
dissent help explain the fission of the PDL in 2010. 
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could in turn be broadened to assess the effects of intra-party competition on other 
topics like portfolio allocation, government formation and stability, parliamentary 
behaviour, and the selection of a party platform. Moreover, the game-theoretic 
model also suggests additional implications for studies on party switching, party 
merger, and party unity in roll call votes. 
Although this article evaluates the implications of the model on party fission 
empirically on a single country, the theoretical model is general and can be useful 
for understand intra-party dynamics in countries with factional politics such as 
Japan as well as other political systems characterized by heterogeneous intra-party 
preferences such as France, Germany, or the UK. Future research could pursue a 
comparative perspective on intra-party politics within different party systems. 
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